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Abstract: COVID-19 has elevated anew the import of holistically conceiving human-environmental well-
being and tackling the overarching precarities of our ecologies, societies and public health in strategies
of securitization. This paper considers the key challenge of reimagining securitization in the aftermath of
COVID-19 and makes two core arguments. The first is that in addressing precarity a key starting point
lies in being mindful of how it is differentially experienced across multiple social hierarchies in the human
world. The paper draws upon Judith Butler’s work on ‘frames of seeing’ to consider how our current moment
can elicit a contrapuntal concern for those who have always been precarious but not in view. The second
core argument is that it is vital to move beyond a concern for human precarity to a concern for a broader
sense of planetary precarity, which in turn prompts the need to strategize for a ‘more-than-human’ sense of
security. Developing the concept of ‘human security’, the paper reflects on how we can usefully envision a
‘more-than-human security’ for a more biologically stable and sustainable planet.
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1. Introduction
Towards the end of Samuel Beckett’s Waiting for Godot,
Vladimir declares that “we are no longer alone, waiting for
the night”. He muses that we are all, in fact, metaphori-
cally “waiting for Godot”, and that life is mostly “waiting for
... waiting” [1]. The years 2020 and 2021 have felt like that,
and throughout the world people have felt the urge to fast-
forward time to a normality once taken for granted and now
craved. In adjusting to the new normal, there is undoubt-
edly a wider appreciation of precarity—no longer seen as
just happening ‘over there’, to ‘them’ and not to ‘us’—and
this is important for the global-scale socio-environmental
challenges faced. But social and environmental precarity
continues to be experienced in hugely disparate ways, with
COVID-19 serving in fact to widen indices of health, poverty
and economic inequalities.
Responding to the COVID-19 pandemic has elevated
the import of holistically conceiving the well-being of our
ecologies and societies. In addressing precarity on multi-
ple scales, a key starting point lies in seeing precarity and
being mindful of how it is differentially experienced across
class, race, gender, sexuality, disability and other social hi-
erarchies in the human world. With this in mind, this paper
draws upon the work of feminist philosopher and social theo-
rist, Judith Butler, on ‘frames of seeing’ to consider how our
current moment can elicit a contrapuntal concern for those
who have always been precarious, by rendering their worlds
visible and a constitutive part of a globally understood pre-
carity. It then critiques the spatial dynamics and excesses
c© 2021 by the authors; licensee Librello, Switzerland. This open access article was published
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of late modern capitalism in contemplating a broader sense
of ‘planetary precarity’, before considering how the concept
of ‘human security’ might usefully be extended to envision
a ‘more-than-human’ sense of security in responding to
COVID-19 and the likelihood of future pandemics [2]. To
begin with, however, the paper opens with a reflection on
securitization as an assemblage of actionable knowledge,
asking critically how we come to define and frame ‘security’.
2. Security and Securitization
In the late 1970s, the philosopher and social theorist, Michel
Foucault, predicted that we would increasingly live in a “so-
ciety of security” ([3], p. 11). For Foucault, modern society
was moving in a direction increasingly typified by prevailing
discourses of securitization, which underpinned a govern-
mentalized world of regulated political, economic and social
subjectivity. Across the social sciences and humanities in
recent years, key contributions have divulged the extent to
which neoliberal discourses of ‘security’ function centrally in
the governing techniques of our contemporary world [4–8].
In the seemingly endless global war on terror, for instance,
we have witnessed how specific registers of interventionism
play pivotal roles in the justification of military securitization
strategies—where ‘identified’ ‘risk’ becomes discursively
binded to ‘necessary’ ‘securitization’ [9,10]. This not only
mirrors broader dimensions of contemporary geopolitical
grand strategy but also echoes a long history of imperialism
in which interventionism was legitimized and actioned via
hegemonic forms of colonial discourse involving registers
of threat, risk, defense and opportunity [11].
To return to Foucault’s critique of modern society, he
incisively laid bare how overlapping structures of governing
power and governing epistemes reinforce and legitimate
each other: “knowledge linked to power not only assumes
the authority of ‘the truth’ but has the power to make itself
true” ([12], p. 27). This ‘power-knowledge’ couplet works
to enable the discursive hegemony of prioritised forms of
knowledge that underpin prevailing forms of governance
and governmentality. In deconstructing global health gover-
nance, Foucault’s power-knowledge couplet has been use-
fully drawn upon via the idea of ‘framing’ or ‘issue framing’,
whereby “an issue is presented in such a way as to tie into a
broader set of ideas about the world, or ‘socially constructed
reality’, and through this gain influence and policy purchase”
([13], p. 3). Framing in global health governance involves
what Colin McInnes and Kelley Ley call the “ideational ele-
ment” of the global health security nexus, wherein prioritised
interventionary policies emerge from an “arena of competi-
tion” in which “ideas matter” and buttress “acceptable path-
ways of government response” ([13], pp. i, 4). Global health
securitization, in other words, like all discourses of security,
is selective, and framed in highly consequential ways for the
enactment of global health policy [14,15].
Recognising the role of framing enables a critique of
global health governance that sees its policy formation and
operationalisation as relying on prioritized ideas of threat,
risk and security. As Adam Ferhani and Simon Rushton
have shown, despite the “internationalist rhetoric govern-
ments engage in”, in the “face of a crisis” this commonly
evaporates and governments instead “prioritize the safety
of their own citizens, their economic interests, and their
own political popularity” ([16], p. 466) [17]. We have wit-
nessed this in the Global North with the vaccine rollout for
COVID-19 in particular. As Ferhani and Rushton reason,
Global North governments find themselves (unusually) at
“the epicenter of the COVID-19 pandemic”, and have on
the whole adopted “nationalistic ‘domestic first’ responses,
undermining the possibilities for international cooperation”
([16], p. 473). They point to the key ‘global health’ securi-
tization challenge consequently faced: generating a shift
away from “disease as a narrow national security concern”,
rethinking “what borders are” and reframing ‘global health
security’ to “detect and respond to infectious disease out-
breaks” ([16], p. 473).
3. Variegated Precarity and the Politics of Space
COVID-19’s securitization is, like all discourses of secu-
rity, an assemblage of knowledge prioritized, framed and
communicated in determinative ways. As Judith Butler has
noted, critiquing how knowledge is constructed begins with
a consideration of how it is dominantly formed within a “con-
temporary social frame” ([18], p. 1). Butler has spent much
of her academic career reflecting on “what it means to be-
come ethically responsive, to consider and attend to the
suffering of others” ([19], p. 951) [20–22]. In this endeavour,
she has illuminated how certain frames of seeing “permit
the representability of the human”, direct “the way in which
suffering is presented to us”, and thus “affect our respon-
siveness”: “whether and how we respond to the suffering
of others, how we formulate moral criticisms, how we ar-
ticulate political analyses, depend upon a certain field of
perceptible reality” ([19], p. 951). Butler’s broader appre-
ciation of the power of subjection and the consequences
for our conditioned subjectivity cautions her in considering
if we can “learn to see the frame that blinds us to what
we see”([19], p. 966) [23]. Mirroring philosopher Susan
Sontag’s concerns in Regarding the Pain of Others [24],
Butler poses the question of whether or not it is possible to
transcend the “final narcissism of our desire to see” when
we have long been conditioned toward an “inability to see
what we see” ([19], p. 966). For Butler, overcoming our con-
ditioned subjectivity requires us to deconstruct and theorize
the “forcible frame” that imposes “constraints on what ‘can’
be heard, read, seen, felt, and known”—and this starts with
recognizing “‘not seeing’ in the midst of seein” ([19], p. 966).
‘Not seeing’ the world for Butler is the result of a “visual
norm” that conducts a “fateful disavowal” of the human suf-
fering of ‘Others’ ([19], p. 966). This remains a fundamental
epistemological challenge, in recognizing, for instance, how
the COVID-19 pandemic involves a variegated precarity and
vulnerability across our communities. We have heard much
about how responding to the crisis relies upon staying at
16
home and retreating to the safety of family units. But as
Butler more recently notes, “not everyone has a household
or a ‘family”’, and “increasing numbers of the population”
are, in fact, “homeless or transient” [25]. Therefore config-
uring the household as a ‘space of protection’ involves a
profound power-knowledge privileging of some worlds over
others. Lynsey Hanley highlights why this matters in the
context of COVID-19: “[s]pace—how it’s apportioned, how
it’s governed, how it’s made available to some and denied to
others—is always political [...] we are being encouraged to
imagine that every home and immediate neighbourhood is
as comfortable and well-resourced as the next: that every-
one has a garden, a computer, a quiet room to study or work
in, and a supermarket and an open space nearby” [26].
Insisting on the enduring politics of space is vital in bring-
ing into view worlds of human suffering that are outside the
dominant frame. In this task, we also need to acknowledge
the implicit racism at the heart of why developed coun-
tries have consistently ignored precarity that happens ‘over
there’. As World Health Organization (WHO) Executive Di-
rector Mike Ryan recently observed, this is why the Global
North was so “entirely complacent of infectious diseases”
prior to the outbreak of COVID-19 [27]. And there is an
onus upon us too to highlight the human picture hidden in
the many soundbite knowledges of the pandemic (particu-
larly on social media and in our dominantly market-driven
news forums) that circulate reductively and in a manner that
dissuades empathy and solidarity. The term ‘underlying
conditions’ is one such example. As urban studies social
theorist Ananya Roy notes, this signifier works to reduce
social conditions to medical symptoms, and in the process
hides the backstory: the “systematic denial of robust and
affordable health care” [28]. It also works of course to ab-
horrently imply that some lives are ultimately disposable.
One could conclude that some lives are indeed dispos-
able, in reflecting on the hierarchical privileging of access
to the emerging vaccines for COVID-19—which Oxfam has
termed the ‘inequality virus’ [29,30]. As Judith Butler once
more observes, we are again seeing many in the privileged
Global North assert their rights to “live at the expense of oth-
ers” by setting out “those who should be protected against
death at all costs and those whose lives are considered not
worth safeguarding against illness and death” [25]. Sadly,
it seems that social and economic inequality will ensure
that COVID-19 discriminates in its societal penetration and
effects—mirroring how we value lives differently, how we
support those lives differently, and ultimately how we differ-
entially recognize lives in our regimes of representation.
4. Capitalism and Planetary Precarity in the
Anthropocene
In addition to appreciating a differentiated and wider sense
of human precarity, a core challenge in imagining a more
just and sustainable post-COVID-19 world lies in articulat-
ing a broader sense of planetary precarity that recognizes
what Janet Wilson and colleagues call the “biocentric inter-
connectedness of the human and more-than-human world”
([31], p. 444). Such a sense of precarity refuses the spu-
rious distinctions so frequently made between human and
non-human worlds, and instead frames an understanding of
conjoined human-environmental precarity on a global scale
[32]. Planetary precarity may have become more visible
as a result of the pandemic, but it predates it to the begin-
ning of an era of ecological stress on the planet that Paul
Crutzen and Eugene Stoermer termed the ‘Anthropocene’
at the turn of the century [33]. The ‘Anthropocene’, which
has also been instructively theorized as the ‘Capitalocene’,
has been typified by far-reaching ecological impacts on the
planet sustained in the wake of an ascendant capitalism since
the industrial revolution [34–38]. In distinguishing the Anthro-
pocene twenty years ago, Crutzen and Stoermer concluded
that a “strategy leading to sustainability of ecosystems against
human induced stresses will be one of the great future tasks”
([33], p. 18)—and that task remains. As Antje Bruns reasons,
“socio-ecological burdens” continue to be the “defining charac-
teristic of the Anthropocene”, and the COVID-19 crisis simply
brings more into view the already existing stresses on the
planet brought about by human behaviour ([39], p. 5).
Alerts to the dangers of overstepping environmental
boundaries in the process of excessive capitalist produc-
tion are not new, of course—the idea of global warming has
been present in the scientific community since the 1930s
and the WHO has consistently warned for over two decades
that climate change and habitat degradation pose significant
overlapping risks in the proliferation of infectious pathogens:
“the spread and increased lability of various infectious dis-
eases, new and old, reflects the impacts of demographic,
environmental, technological and other rapid changes in hu-
man ecology” ([40], p. 104). There is no doubt that scientific
and social scientific expertise on planetary ecological stress
needs to impact more in terms critical public scholarship,
and a crucial challenge lies in insisting on the scalar connec-
tions and relational geographies of environmental stress and
consequent precarity, as David Quammen and others have
shown [41–43]. This is key to what Bruns has highlighted
as the necessity of “zooming out a little” in order to see the
interconnected “struggles and contractions in this era called
the Anthropocene”, which is marked by a range of issues,
from population growth, pollution and climate change, to bio-
diversity loss and resource grabs that mirror the unrelenting
goal of capitalist economic growth ([39], p. 6).
Political economic critiques of late modern capitalism
are vital in contextualising the challenges of planetary pre-
carity we face. Deregulated extractivism, excessive con-
sumerism, overlapping environmental stresses, growing
economic inequalities and the ecologically unsustainable
idea of continuous economic growth collectively demand
a fundamental reappraisal of what an economy is actually
designed for. There is an acute need for repeatedly mak-
ing the argument that market concerns and profit—to the
detriment of environmental and human health—is no longer
acceptable as the rationale for ‘development’ and ‘growth’.
Market-driven, econcentric rationales prevail in so many
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aspects of contemporary life. Manifesting in everything from
increasingly technocratic forms of government to deepen-
ing regimes of performance management, such rationales
have been seen at the heart of global health governance
too. As Matt Sparke observes, the governance of global
health has unobtrusively adapted “calculations from global
finance to manage global health interventions” ([44], p. 48).
. Sparke’s concerns are echoed by Susan Sell and Owain
Williams, who have outlined the multiple “underlying struc-
tural effects of capitalism on health” that are evident at every
human-environmental scale—effects that mirror a “market
fundamentalism” that “profoundly” shapes global health gov-
ernance in areas such as “trade and investment policy”,
“austerity programs”, and “pharmaceutical and food gover-
nance” ([45], p. 1). Sell and Williams convincingly show
how neoliberal capitalism “generates health outcomes like
no other system”, resulting in what they term “structurally
pathogenic” negative impacts ([45], p. 1).
Joining the dots on the structural violence wrought by
neoliberal capitalism on human and environmental health
is an urgent and vital task that requires a holistic conceptu-
alization of conjoined human and environmental security in
the Anthropocene. One of the most important connections
to illuminate between capitalist productions and ecological
after-effects on a global scale relates to ‘Big Farm’ agribusi-
ness and regulating how we ethically and environmentally
produce food [46,47]. A primary economic driver of ecologi-
cal stress is the demand for cheap meat that has seen a rise
in industrial-sized cattle, pig and chicken farming. Apart from
the well-documented methane emissions and the various
core animal welfare issues, intensive farming has been linked
to “local biodiversity damage from ammonia emissions”, de-
forestation due to the “reliance on protein-rich crops such
as soya as animal feed”, and multiple “detrimental impacts”
on communities, including the dissemination of “harmful bac-
teria, viruses and air pollutants” [48]. In the wildlife food
sector, agribusiness has evidently played a central role in
the emergence of COVID-19, and indeed in many of the
other deadly pathogens we have seen in recent decades.
Karin Brulliard usefully historicizes the consequences of a
largely unregulated global wildlife trade: “[COVID-19] began
like so many pandemics and outbreaks before: inside an
animal. The virus’s original host was almost certainly a bat
[...] as was the case with Ebola, SARS, MERS and lesser-
known viruses such as Nipah and Marburg [...] Wild animals
have always had viruses coursing through their bodies. But
a global wildlife trade worth billions of dollars, agricultural
intensification, deforestation and urbanization are bringing
people closer to animals, giving their viruses more of what
they need to infect us: opportunity” [49,50].
In the hugely profitable exotic food industry, opportuni-
ties for infection are being facilitated in particular by in-
creased encroachment on wild forests. As Catrin Ein-
horn documents, the “destruction of forests into fragmented
patches is increasing the likelihood that viruses and other
pathogens will jump from wild animals to humans”, and, as
coronaviruses are zoonotic, further outbreaks are not only
probable but inevitable [51]. The United Nations Environ-
ment Programme have underscored the worrying global
picture: “diseases passed from animals to humans are on
the rise, as the world continues to see unprecedented de-
struction of wild habitats by human activity” [52]. They set
out the core challenge of containing transmissions: address-
ing the “multiple and often interacting threats to ecosystems
and wildlife to prevent zoonoses from emerging, including
habitat loss and fragmentation” [52].
Agribusiness is the principal force driving habitat loss
and ecological fragmentation globally today, and we need
to be especially attentive to how the industry (and particu-
larly major corporations such as Monsanto) has worked to
deflect regulation. Rob Wallace and colleagues have under-
lined instructively the ecological and pathological corollaries
of unregulated agribusiness cutting further and further into
the last wild forests for exotic food: “[f]ocusing on outbreak
zones ignores the relations shared by global economic ac-
tors that shape epidemiologies [and] the capital interests
backing development- and production-induced changes in
land use and disease emergence” [53]. They detail how
agribusiness has reconfigured its “extractivist operations
into spatially discontinuous networks across territories”, in
which the new geography is “embodied by changes in com-
pany management structure, capitalization, subcontracting,
supply chain substitutions, leasing, and transnational land
pooling”—all of which enables economic production that
flexibly traverses “ecologies and political borders” but also
generates “new epidemiologies along the way” [53]. And
they incisively divulge how agribusiness’ major corporations
have consistently worked “toward fewer government inspec-
tions of farms and processing plants, legislation against
government surveillance and activist exposé, and legisla-
tion against even reporting on the specifics of deadly out-
breaks in media outlets” [53]. This is critically important to
expose in responding effectively to COVID-19, because the
cause of the current global pandemic is not found “just in
the object of any one infectious agent or its clinical course”,
but rather in “the field of ecosystemic relations that capital
and other structural causes have pinned back to their own
advantage” [53].
5. Towards a Planetary Sense of Security
“Historically, pandemics have forced humans to break with
the past and imagine their world anew. This one is no dif-
ferent. It is a portal, a gateway between one world and
the next. We can choose to walk through it, dragging the
carcasses of our prejudice and hatred, our avarice, our data
banks and dead ideas, our dead rivers and smoky skies
behind us. Or we can walk through lightly, with little luggage,
ready to imagine another world” [54].
Writer and political activist Arundhati Roy’s thoughtful
reflection above centres on a core challenge of human tran-
sition throughout history. Imagining a new and better world
involves, on the one hand, carefully documenting and un-
derstanding the dysfunctions of the old, and, on the other,
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creatively envisioning a greater sense of planetary security
for the present and future. For the latter task, there are
key questions to ponder in thinking through how we tran-
sition towards a more responsible living and governing of
the planet. George Monbiot is one of many public com-
mentators who have urged governments to respond bravely
and ambitiously to the COVID-19 emergency by planning
to build a different, greener economy [55]. And the evi-
dence supports the payoff for investment. The health and
well-being corollaries of less frenetic economic production
are becoming clearer, for example, as the fog of excessive
travel and consumption clears [56]. The improvement in
air quality during the various lockdowns is one indicative
index that can be drawn upon to prompt recognition of the
positives for human and environmental health in shifting to
cleaner modes of transport and energy production [57].
Rod Wallace and colleagues have argued that what we
need in the world now is nothing short of a reintroduction
into “Earth’s cycles of regeneration’, a “rediscovering of our
sense of individuation in multitudes beyond capital and the
state” [53]. This equates to a “disalienation” from capital-
ism’s excesses, which is necessary for what they term “the
next great human transition” in which we must “navigate out”
of capitalism’s global circuits of ecological destruction [53].
They point to immediate solutions: “[w]e protect the for-
est complexity that keeps deadly pathogens from lining up
hosts for a straight shot onto the world’s travel network. We
reintroduce livestock and crop diversities, and reintegrate
animal and crop farming at scales that keep pathogens from
ramping up in virulence and geographic extent. We allow
our food animals to reproduce onsite, restarting the natural
selection that allows immune evolution to track pathogens
in real time” [53]. These are some of the ways in which we
can regulate how we interact with the planet in a manner
that does not see it as simply another commodity in an
unconstrained economy.
Author of Against Extinction, geographer Bill Adams, re-
cently pondered how the global lockdown offers a “window
into an ecological past” and “a vision of a possible ecological
future” [58]. He wonders whether our rediscovered “closeness
to nature” and “new appreciation of each other” might lead
us to “imagine a different future” [58]. Such hopes have been
echoed at key nodes of global governance as the pandemic
unfolds. UN Secretary General, António Guterres, for instance,
has asserted that COVID-19 has reminded us of “the price
we pay for weaknesses in health systems, social protections
and public services”, and that now is the time to “redouble our
efforts to build more inclusive and sustainable economies and
societies” [59]. For Guterres, the recovery must result in a
different economy, and he points to the UN’s 2030 agenda and
sustainable development goals as the roadmap. He stresses
the import of protecting future generations through commit-
ted climate action and the need for human rights to feature
centrally in responding to the crisis [60].
Inspiring declarations become simply rhetoric, of course,
unless they are activated in tangible and legally binding
ways. This requires strengthening and resourcing the global
governance architecture of UN agencies such as the WHO
with the necessary measures to effectively oversee states
and corporations complying with global conventions. Orig-
inally dating from the WHO’s World Health Assembly in
Boston in 1969, the concept and ambition of ‘global health
security’ in the form of the International Health Regulations
(IHR) was rejuvenated in the aftermath of the first SARS
coronavirus outbreak in 2002, culminating in the revision of
the IHR in 2005. The IHR is a legally binding instrument of
international law that aims for international collaboration in
combatting the global spread of disease, and empowers the
WHO as the main global surveillance system. The IHR was
designed to oversee cooperation between states, but “there
has been widespread contravention”, and the “WHO lacks
enforcement power”, as Adam Ferhani and Simon Ruston
lament ([16], p. 472).
The COVID-19 pandemic has elicited rigorous debates
about the role, responsibility and powers of the WHO
[61,62]. During the Ebola outbreak in 2014, its reputation
became “irrefutably damaged”, with the “general consen-
sus in the global health community that it fell short of its
leadership responsibilities”, as Clare Wenham observes,
due largely to its shackling “financial and organizational
constraints” ([63], p. 1). In the wake of further WHO failures
during COVID-19, Tine Hanrieder has considered how the
organization could be “strengthened beyond the pandemic”
given the lack of “political commitment” for “an organiza-
tion that has been weakened over decades” by a range
of issues including primarily “underfunded mission creep”
([64], p. 534). As she notes, positive developments such as
“priority setting” and “strategic budgeting” might well be con-
sistent aspirations in the WHO but these are sought in the
context of a now normative model of public-private partner-
ships championed by the WHO’s biggest shareholders, and
so “without a new global social contract for public interest
policy-making” the WHO’s ability to “further global public
health will remain limited” ([64], p. 541). As we emerge
from COVID-19, there seems no doubt that a key task lies
in renewing the WHO and enabling a more effective global
health governance architecture. In this endeavour, envision-
ing global health securitization is a key challenge.
6. More-than-human Security
The global health security crisis experienced in the wake of
COVID-19 was guaranteed by a long-established hegemony
of narrowly conceived statist security concerns. Dominant
forms of statist securitization, focused on borders and territo-
rial, military and police control, are typically bereft of broader
‘human security’ registers that could have been anticipa-
tory of the holistic and people-centred security measures
required to respond more effectually and cooperatively to
a global pandemic [65–68]. When COVID-19 hit, the im-
poverished understanding and functioning of what consti-
tutes ‘security’ was frightfully exposed in the calamitous
inadequacies of healthcare infrastructures globally. Health
security—a core component of the United Nations Develop-
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ment Programme (UNDP) ‘human security’ concept—had
not previously featured centrally on the security agenda [2].
It had not been prioritized, and crucially had not been in-
vested in and resourced. Historicizing this fact is important.
The failure to prepare for COVID-19 did not just start in De-
cember 2019, but was in fact “programmed decades ago as
the shared commons of public health were simultaneously
neglected and monetized” [53].
Mike Davis has argued that the now obvious absence of
“a truly international public health infrastructure” has shown
“capitalist globalization” to be “biologically unsustainable”
[69]. And if capitalism cannot secure public health, then it
is surely not fit for future-proofing the planet. In confronting
COVID-19, furthermore, we have seen how healthcare sys-
tems exclude people’s access “on the basis of resources,
employment and/or immigration status”, which exposes “the
pressing need for articulating systems that respect, pro-
tect and guarantee the universal human right of everyone”,
as Dorothy Estrada-Tanck observes [70]. And registering
further the need to envisage security more broadly, Karin
Brulliard remarks how COVID-19 “underscores the need for
a more holistic ‘one health’ approach, which views human,
animal and environmental health as interconnected” [49].
In seeking to secure a more sustainable planet for the
future, Joel Makower asks can we “extend the ‘flatten the
curve’ meme to climate change and make it as ubiquitously
understood and accepted as it is for the coronavirus?” [71].
This, once again, is a challenge of envisioning securitiza-
tion differently and more broadly. If we are to progressively
tackle climate change, we need to frame an interlinked
sense of human-environmental security, and mobilize more
holistic critical knowledges, expertise and governing ratio-
nales on overlapping human-environmental precarities.
In communicating an interconnected sense of global pre-
carity in progressive discourses of climate action and sus-
tainability, considering how the UNDP’s 1994 concept of
‘human security’ might be constructively extended can aid
us [2]. Despite its seven components, human security as a
singular signifier is discursively centred on human security,
which in turn misses a vital signalling of conjoined human
and non-human precarity. In this sense, it may be use-
ful to envisage a ‘more-than-human’ sense of security in
setting out a planetary precarity that mirrors our overlap-
ping human and more-than-human world. Envisioning a
‘more-than-human security’ enables an imagining of a post-
COVID-19 world that refutes distinctions between human
and non-human worlds, and instead frames a picture of inter-
connected human-environmental precarity on a global scale.
In the aftermath of COVID-19, there is a palpable need
for framing and planning for a sense of ‘more-than-human
security’, in which human security’s component elements of
‘health security’ and ‘environmental security’, in particular,
are increasingly activated in a manner than holistically ad-
dresses the overlapping human-environmental precarities
of our globally interconnected system. This challenge is
broader than the need to reform and re-resource the WHO
[72,73]. We have reached a point, as Kelley Lee and Ju-
lianne Piper have argued, where we need a “fundamental
reimagining of global health governance”, in which gov-
ernance needs to be about “building societies’ resilience
across a full range of threats, including climate change, pan-
demic diseases, and economic crises”, and ‘global health
security’ must be “conceptualized as part of a complex
adaptive system” that poses “novel governance challenges
because of higher connectivity, nonlinear dynamics, mul-
tidirectional patterns of change, and emergent properties”
([74], pp. 530-531). As we emerge from COVID-19, we face
an urgent task of framing securitization for a more holisti-
cally understood and sustainable planet. This challenge
centres on effecting a vision for a more-than-human sense
of security that signals overlapping human and environmen-
tal concerns, stresses global interconnectedness and the
need for global solidarity, and ultimately offers a framework
for securitization that supersedes unilateralism and excep-
tionalism by seeing human and environmental precarity as
conjoined and existing beyond borders.
7. Conclusion
In the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, have we reached a
tipping point in thinking productively and responsibly about
planetary precarity? Up until now, we have been living a
capitalist fable in many ways. It is clear now that the ex-
cessive consumerist conceit of late modern capitalism was
always biologically unsustainable, and this has been shown
to have been economically unstable too. Now is the time
for brave and principled leadership, and not for environmen-
tal and political-economic denial, misinformation strategies,
and tacit support for powerful corporate interests [75–77].
As Mike Davis imploringly reasons, we need “effective re-
sponses to present and future plagues, ones that mobilize
popular courage, give leadership to science, and use the
resources of a comprehensive system of universal health
coverage and public medicine” [78].
In different ways, like Vladimir and Estragon in Samuel
Beckett’s Waiting for Godot, we are all waiting now, waiting
and hoping for a safer world, and it is not just the desti-
tute, the poor, the hungry, the marginalized, the out of view.
While we wait, we must agitate for a deeper appreciation
of planetary precarity and global interconnectedness to
emerge from COVID-19. Global solidarity and collective
responsibility for safeguarding the future is more important
now than ever before. In strategizing for this critical task,
convincingly framing a more-than-human sense of security
is vital to establishing a path towards a healthier and more
sustainable planet.
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